



# Fire and Rescue Services in Wales: Learning from Grenfell

# Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser Thematic Review written by:

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Thematic Review in to the extent to which the Welsh Fire and Rescue Services have taken action to address the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations

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## Introduction and background

Following the publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI) Phase 1 report I was tasked by the Deputy Minister for Housing and Local Government to establish a mechanism for reporting on action taken by the 3 Welsh Fire and Rescue Services (FRS) against the recommendations contained within the GTI Phase 1 report.

I took the view that this would be best achieved by undertaking a Thematic Review considering the extent to which the 3 Welsh FRS had addressed the GTI Phase 1 report recommendations that were of direct relevance to them (a number of recommendations were directed exclusively at London Fire Brigade and other London based organisations). The last Thematic Review of Welsh FRS was published in early 2017 by the then Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, Des Tidbury, and was entitled 'Learning lessons to avoid safety critical incidents – how well do Fire and Rescue Authorities learn lessons from incidents to improve public and firefighter safety'. This Review made 8 recommendations around learning lessons from significant incidents, the majority of which were relevant in the context of the Grenfell Tower fire, although the Review itself pre-dated the incident. I felt it would be appropriate therefore to also consider the findings of this Thematic Review against the 8 recommendations of the 2017 Thematic Review.

Having read the GTI Phase 1 report in some detail I have identified a number of operational issues relevant to the Welsh FRS that are not explicitly recognised either within the GTI Phase 1 report or its recommendations. Such issues include the use of the FRS operational Decision Making Model, Breathing Apparatus command and control procedures and firefighting tactics. These issues are common to all incident types and are certainly not unique to high rise incidents which, understandably, are the focus of the GTI Phase 1 report.

This report sets out the findings of the Thematic Review specific to the GTI Phase 1 report recommendations. It also considers the wider operational issues not specifically identified in the GTI Phase 1 report but those which I have identified as being relevant to the Welsh FRS. Finally, it considers the extent to which the 3 Welsh FRS have addressed the 8 recommendations contained within the 2017 Thematic Review.

## Methodology

On 30 November 2019 I wrote to the 3 Chief Fire Officers requesting their responses to the GTI Phase 1 report recommendations and advising that I was minded to use the responses to form the basis of a Thematic Review in order to give the necessary assurances to the Deputy Minister.

After reviewing the responses, I wrote to the nominated points of contact within the 3 FRS on 31 January 2020 enclosing a table which contained the GTI recommendations on which this review focused along with the key areas of assessment. A copy of the letter is attached to this report at Appendix 1. I selected the recommendations as I considered them to be most relevant to the Welsh FRS. A short rationale was provided explaining why each recommendation was selected along with the means by which the extent to which the recommendation has been actioned would be judged. The selected recommendations were predominantly operational.

I advised the 3 FRS that it was my intention to conduct the Thematic Review in two stages. Firstly I proposed to undertake a desktop review with the support of the Assistant Fire and Rescue Advisor, of FRS operational guidance and policy appertaining to the recommendations.

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Thereafter I proposed to follow up where necessary through discussions with relevant FRS personnel and undertaking visits to the FRS.

We requested responses from the FRS by 28 February 2020 after which we proposed to complete the desktop review by the end of April followed by any fieldwork to be completed by the end of July. The intention was to produce this report by October 2020.

We received substantive, comprehensive and thorough responses from all 3 FRS. As a result of the Covid pandemic it was necessary to postpone completing the desktop review until early August with follow up meetings taking place remotely throughout August and September. These meetings were held via Teams and Skype with Lead Officers with responsibility for Incident Command and Breathing Apparatus training, Site Specific Risk Information and Operational Assurance. Substantial amounts of further information was provided by Lead Officers following requests we made during the follow up meetings. This was in addition to the information requested for the desktop review.

The level of engagement from all Officers throughout the Thematic Review was exemplary. I recognise the demands this Review placed on individual Officers despite our efforts to limit its impact. Nothing was too much trouble and it is only right and proper that is recognised within this report (see Acknowledgements).

## Executive Summary

All 3 FRS have invested significant time, effort and resources in responding to the Grenfell Tower fire. Much of this work was undertaken prior to the publication of the GTI Phase 1 report, in support of wider action coordinated by the National Fire Chiefs Council.

The 3 FRS were able to evidence progress against all but one of the GTI recommendations selected as the focus of the Thematic Review. The exception was Recommendation 33.20 relating to communicating fire survival guidance in live time to the bridgehead as no technical solution exists at this time. This builds on the work previously reported to the Senedd Equality, Local Government and Communities Committee in December 2019.

The 3 FRS all offered evidence of notable practice which is set out within the main body of this report.

During the Review I identified a number of issues which were not expressly identified either within the main body of the GTI Phase 1 report or its recommendations. These issues include the use of the FRS operational Decision Making Model, Breathing Apparatus command and control procedures and firefighting tactics.

I make a number of recommendations for the FRS to consider in relation to these issues within this report.

In considering the extent to which the 3 FRS have acted on the recommendations of the 2017 Thematic Review 'Learning lessons to avoid safety critical incidents – how well do Fire and Rescue Authorities learn lessons from incidents to improve public and firefighter safety' strong evidence was offered for 6 of the 8 recommendations. Further work is required to establish the extent to which the remaining 2 recommendations have been actioned. Once this work is concluded I will report my findings to the Deputy Minister under separate cover.

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Overall I am of the view that the work undertaken by the 3 FRS in anticipating and then responding to the GTI Phase 1 report recommendations has substantially reduced the likelihood of such catastrophic outcomes at an incident occurring in Wales.

## Findings – GTI recommendations

A table for each FRS setting out their response to the GTI recommendations is attached to this report at Appendix 2. A consolidated summary of the responses is provided under the 8 subject areas below which are lifted directly from the GTI Phase 1 report.

### High Rise Residential Building Materials

There is one recommendation selected under this subject area which is in relation to the importance of FRS personnel at all levels having an understanding of the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and knowing how to recognise it when it occurs. The 3 Welsh FRS had been proactive in highlighting such risks. All 3 FRS provided theoretical input and practical firefighting training for their staff that covered the risk of external fire spread. Local training was enhanced by South Wales FRS through live fire high rise firefighting training provided in collaboration with West Midlands Fire Service (FS). All 3 FRS demonstrated compliance against this recommendation.

### Firefighting Information

There are two recommendations selected under this subject area. The first relates to the importance of having appropriate risk information readily available when dealing with a high rise incident. The second recommends that Officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in carrying out risk gathering procedures. All 3 FRS demonstrated compliance against these recommendations.

The 3 FRS have consistent approaches to gathering site specific risk information, all of which are based on Guidance issued by the then Department for Communities and Local Government in 2012, concerning the Provision of Operational Risk Information System (PORIS)<sup>1</sup>. This is captured within a standard operational procedure in each of the 3 FRS which forms the basis of the required training on PORIS.

### Plans

There is one recommendation selected under this subject area which is concerned with the FRS being equipped to receive and store electronic floor plans and to make them available to Incident Commanders and Fire Control managers. North Wales and Mid & West Wales FRS, have demonstrated full compliance against this recommendation. South Wales FRS have made substantial progress in working towards completion and so are regarded as partially compliant at the time of writing (although this work is likely to have been completed by the time of the publication of this report).

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<sup>1</sup> Fire and Rescue Service Operational Guidance - Operational Risk Information

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## Firefighting Lifts

There are two recommendations selected under this subject area which are that the owner and manager of every high rise residential building should be required by law to carry out regular inspections of designated lifts for Firefighters, and to test the lift mechanism, where fitted, that allows firefighters to take control of a lift, reporting the results monthly to the FRS.

Although there is no legal duty on building owners and managers to comply with these recommendations all 3 FRS take action which ensures that the spirit and intent is met. Firefighting lifts are inspected as part of the audit process for enforcing the Fire Safety Order. If defects are identified outside of the audit process either by the owner or manager carrying out a test, or by operational personnel carrying out Site Specific Risk Information gathering visits, this information is made available to operational personnel through updates to the mobilising system.

## Control – Incident communication

The four recommendations under this subject area focus on reviewing policies on communications between Fire Control and the Incident Commander, providing training for Incident Commanders and Fire Control managers and that a dedicated communication link be established between Fire Control and the Incident Commander. All 3 FRS are considered to be compliant against the four recommendations.

In relation to reviewing policies on communications between Fire Control and the Incident Commander, South Wales and Mid & West Wales FRS evidenced that they have embedded the Decision Making Model in to their processes for communications with their Joint Fire Control. North Wales FRS have progressed a review of this work via their Operational Learning Forum.

All 3 Welsh FRS have development programmes in place to ensure there is the required acquisition and maintenance of skills and knowledge for Incident Commanders managing high rise incidents. This is assured through an assessment process, which uses a combination of practical training and immersive technology to simulate scenarios. An important aspect of this training and assessment involves effective communication between the incident ground and Fire Control in particular when managing multiple fire survival guidance calls. Similarly, appropriate training is provided for Fire Control managers to ensure that they are able to effectively communicate with the Incident Commander.

The practical means are in place for links to be established between Fire Controls and the Incident Commander. This is predominantly through Airwave radios on fire appliances or Incident Command Units, if in attendance. All Tactical Officers are issued their own Airwave radio, allowing an additional level of resilience for communications. Mobile phone contact can also be instigated where required.

## Emergency Calls

There are five recommendations selected from this subject area.

The recommendation relating to the recording of fire survival guidance information and simultaneously displaying it at the bridgehead and in Incident Command Units has been partially met by all three FRS. Work has been progressed to improve communication links including the ability to stand up a Command Room at the Joint Fire Control for South Wales and Mid & West Wales FRS to

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allow information on fire survival guidance to be passed directly to Command Support at the incident. North Wales FRS have implemented systems to ensure that if 'overflow' calls are received that require fire survival guidance, a consistent approach is applied around passing this information to the incident ground. No technological solution exists at this time to provide live fire survival guidance updates at the bridgehead or Incident Command Unit (response for GTI recommendation 33.20 refers).

All three FRS are regarded as compliant for the recommendations related to managing a transition from 'stay put' to 'get out,' and ensuring Fire Control personnel receive specific training.

To ensure sufficient resilience is built in to the call handling procedure it is necessary that assisting Fire Controls can obtain access to information available in the host Fire Control. South Wales and Mid & West Wales FRS have a Joint Fire Control co-located with South Wales Police at the Joint Public Service Centre. Similarly, North Wales Fire Control is co-located with North Wales Police. In respect of direct FRS information availability as required by the recommendation, reciprocal arrangements are in place between the two Fire Controls in Wales allowing each other's information to be viewed. All 3 FRS are regarded as compliant for this recommendation.

To develop the theme of information sharing, a recommendation is made in respect of the provision of information to the FRS from the Ambulance Service and Police. This work requires a broader multi-agency approach, which has been identified as an issue to be addressed by the Joint Emergency Services Group. The 3 FRS are considered to be partially compliant with this recommendation as this work is not yet concluded.

## Command and Control

There are four recommendations selected from this subject area. These relate to control of deployments and the use of resources, improved quality of information from returning crews, improved communications between Fire Control and the incident ground, and the potential for direct communications between Fire Control and the bridgehead to provide live updates on actions taken in response to fire survival guidance.

The 3 FRS train and assess their personnel on control of deployments and use of resources. In terms of the quality of information from returning Breathing Apparatus teams the 3 FRS have standard operational procedures and training in place to meet this recommendation. Examples include South Wales FRS including post deployment debriefing in the learning outcomes from the live fire high rise training with West Midlands FS, Mid & West Wales FRS using maps and diagrams to support written notes and North Wales FRS developing a Breathing Apparatus brief/debrief log using the military Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Communication planning framework.

In terms of developing a communication system between Fire Control and the Incident Commander, the required equipment and procedures are in place within the 3 FRS. Communications can be established by Airwave radio through the fire appliance designated as the control point or the Incident Command Unit, if in attendance. As stated previously if the Incident Commander is a Tactical Officer s/he will have an individually issued Airwave radio, giving an additional level of resilience. Tactical Officers are also able to communicate with Fire Control by mobile phone.

The 3 FRS are not currently progressing the recommendation relating to the provision of a direct line of communication between the Control room and the bridgehead (GTI recommendation 33.20) due to the absence of a technical solution. The 3 FRS are considered as being compliant against all of the other recommendations relating to Command and Control.

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## Equipment

There are two recommendations selected from this subject area.

All 3 FRS have upgraded their Breathing Apparatus communications equipment, allowing them to satisfy the requirements of the recommendation relating to the provision of equipment that allows communications with the bridgehead, including when operating in a high rise environment.

In terms of ensuring that the command support system is fully operative on all Incident Command Units and that crews are trained in its use, all 3 FRS have demonstrated compliance against the recommendation. The command support function is fully embedded each of the FRS standard operational procedures, with appropriate training provided. Each FRS has a dedicated Incident Command Unit, which enables the required level of command support and incident management to be provided for larger scale incidents .

## Notable practice

Each FRS offered examples of notable practice.

South Wales FRS have been proactive in understanding the operational risks presented by high rise incidents, and preparing accordingly. Prior to the Grenfell Tower fire, high rise procedures had been developed as a result of other high rise incidents across the UK. Following the Grenfell Tower fire a High Rise Task Group was established to anticipate the outcomes of the GTI.

Due to the profile of the Service area and the large number of high rise buildings, South Wales FRS recognised the need for practical training to support the theoretical input delivered initially. They engaged with West Midlands FS to provide live fire training in a high rise environment at the purpose built facility in West Bromwich. This training was provided on a phased basis, taking account of the South Wales risk profile with personnel stationed in the Newport and Cardiff areas trained first. Learning outcomes from this training included early identification of compartmentation and building failure, external fire spread and ventilation strategies. These outcomes are now embedded within South Wales FRS operational guidance.

Mid & West Wales FRS are developing their fire ground technology to improve their response to high rise incidents whereby information can be made available on the incident ground as soon as Joint Fire Control update the mobilising system. This allows information to be accessed by the Incident Commander and Officers at the bridgehead or Incident Command Unit to inform effective decision making.

This work stream is part of a broader strategy to provide an enhanced digital capacity on the incident ground. Capabilities being developed include creating Wi-Fi bubbles for appliances, the provision of mobile tablets for all Tactical Officers, using live video footage from body worn cameras and the use of a GPS tracking system.

North Wales FRS have recognised the importance of the provision and recording of information to inform operational decision making and planning, particularly in relation to Breathing Apparatus team deployments. Building on their adoption of Operational Guidance Breathing Apparatus and the subsequent National Occupational Guidance Foundation for Breathing Apparatus, a brief/debrief log has been developed and is used on every occasion that Breathing Apparatus is worn. This was

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progressed through the North Wales FRS Operational Learning Forum, focusing on incidents across the UK.

The log uses the military Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Communication Plan (SMEAC) mnemonic, which is regarded as an effective system for documenting operational information, enabling it to be clearly understood by personnel. The log is provided in duplicate, enabling identical information to be provided to the Incident Commander and others at an incident to inform operational planning.

## Findings – wider operational issues

During the course of the Review a number of wider operational issues were identified. These issues are as follows;

- **Critical incident decision making and the use of the FRS Decision Making Model.** On studying the GTI Phase 1 report in detail I found limited evidence of London Fire Brigade officers adhering to the principles of the FRS Decision Making Model until the attendance of the then Assistant Commissioner Andy Roe. This is specifically in regards to gathering incident, hazard and resource information, prioritising objectives and developing and clearly communicating an effective tactical plan.
- **The extent of alignment of Welsh FRS doctrine with National Operational Guidance.** National Operational Guidance is founded on the principle of hazard and risk control. Identification and understanding of hazard information is an integral component of the Situation domain of the FRS Decision Making Model and is therefore critical to effective decision making. The 3 Welsh FRS have yet to fully align their doctrine with National Operational Guidance.
- **The relationship between Welsh FRS operational guidance and the process of gathering and utilising Site Specific Risk Information.** If Welsh FRS operational guidance is fully aligned to National Operational Guidance then personnel should have sound underpinning knowledge of generic hazards, control measures and control measure tactics. This knowledge can be supplemented through the Site Specific Risk Information gathering process to provide incident specific hazard information to inform operational decision making. Full alignment with National Operational Guidance offers the opportunity to streamline the Site Specific Risk Information gathering process within the 3 FRS.
- **Breathing Apparatus command and control procedures and tactical firefighting.** It is unclear from the GTI report whether Breathing Apparatus Teams were designated call signs<sup>2</sup> or if they were briefed to carry out specific search techniques. This would have been of critical importance when undertaking search audits and acting on fire survival guidance information. In order to clear a floor with confidence the Search Sector Commander would need to know which flats had been searched and by which Breathing Apparatus teams. It is also unclear if any consideration was given to calculating the tactical flow rates of water required to extinguish a fire of such magnitude and whether or not such flow rates could be achieved. If it had been established at the outset that it would have been very difficult if not impossible to extinguish the fire then a decision around abandoning the stay put policy and attempting a full evacuation could have been taken sooner.
- **The effectiveness of the Welsh FRS Operational Assurance process.** Issues such as those previously identified can occur at any incident. An effective Operational Assurance process should identify issues and put in place corrective actions to address them.

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<sup>2</sup> In the GTI Phase 1 report Breathing Apparatus Teams are referenced by the names of the wearers

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## Critical incident decision making and the use of the FRS Decision Making Model

The extant Fire and Rescue National Framework for Wales requires the FRS to consider and implement National Operational Guidance. The National Operational Guidance for Incident Command is accompanied by supporting guidance entitled 'Incident command; Knowledge, skills and competence' which is intended to provide the detail required for assertive, safe and effective incident command to be practiced and applied. Incident command; Knowledge, skills and competence references the Operational Decision Making Model which was developed by London Fire Brigade in the 1990s and formed the basis of the first and subsequent editions of the legacy Fire and Rescue Service Manuals on Incident Command which pre date the National Operational Guidance program.

The pre National Operational Guidance editions of the Incident Command Guidance all contain a detailed description of each stage of the Decision Making Model set in the context of dynamic risk assessment. They also describe the process by which an Incident Commander, after gathering and considering incident, hazard and resource information should use the Decision Making Model to set objectives as part of an overall tactical plan and continually review the extent to which the objectives are met. This detailed description is absent within the National Operational Guidance.

The National Operational Guidance contains extensive content on decision making. It gives detailed descriptions of the psychological processes by which Incident Commanders make decisions and introduces the principle of the decision control process. It does not however contain the detailed description of each stage of the Decision Making Model or a description of how an Incident Commander should use the model to develop a tactical plan as contained in the legacy Fire and Rescue Service Manuals. We consider this to be a significant omission.

An understanding of each stage of the Decision Making Model is essential for Incident Commanders to make effective critical incident decisions. This is particularly relevant with the transition to National Operational Guidance which is predicated on the principle of hazard and risk control as 'Hazard Information' is a fundamental component of the 'Situation' domain within the Decision Making Model. We return to this point when considering the extent of alignment of Welsh FRS operational guidance with National Operational Guidance, not least because all 3 FRS include the National Operational Guidance diagram of the Decision Making Model within their operational guidance (which is undoubtedly good practice if Incident Commanders understand fully how the Decision Making Model should be used but is potentially meaningless if not).

The Welsh FRS take a standardised approach to Supervisory Manager Incident Command training and development. To progress on to the Supervisory Manager training program delivered in each FRS a candidate must pass a written examination set by the All Wales Incident Command Working Group and demonstrate point of entry competence supervising a standard practice and an operational scenario. Following the demise of the statutory examinations from the Fire Service Examinations Board many UK FRS's have adopted this approach which is entirely sensible and appropriate.

The syllabus for the written examination is based on National Operational Guidance and includes Incident Command along with the additional information contained within the 'Incident command; Knowledge, skills and competence' guidance. If successful in the written and practical scenario the candidate will attend a one week training course. Typically the course consists of theoretical input on day one and two, primarily around the guidance set out within 'Incident command; Knowledge, skills

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and competence', followed by practical sessions for the remaining three days utilising a combination of computer simulation and yard exercises.

We were able to establish in the follow up interviews that no theoretical input is delivered on the course around each of the stages of the Decision Making Model and how it should be worked through sequentially to develop a tactical plan. The scope of this Thematic Review is limited to the Welsh FRS however from informal enquiries we were able to establish that this position is replicated with a number of training providers including the Fire Service College. This is understandable as the information is no longer contained within National Operational Guidance which forms the basis of the training syllabuses. This issue therefore rests primarily with the National Operational Guidance program more so than with the Welsh FRS.

**Recommendation 1** – that the Welsh FRS include a detailed description of each stage of the FRS Decision Making Model similar to that contained within Appendix 4 of the legacy Fire and Rescue Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations Incident Command Third Edition 2008 within their operational guidance and Incident Command training syllabus. This description should extend to how the model should be used to set objectives to deliver a tactical plan and to continually review the effectiveness of the plan.

Postscript – the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor has engaged with the Chair of the National Fire Chiefs Council over this issue. An NFCC workstream has been tasked with developing Incident Command training materials which should address this recommendation.

## The extent of alignment of Welsh FRS doctrine with National Operational Guidance

The extant South and Mid & West Wales FRS operational guidance and standard operational procedures are based on the legacy Generic Risk Assessment index. North Wales FRS utilise service operational policy and procedure orders developed on but not exactly aligned to the Generic Risk Assessment index. These effectively serve the same purpose as standard operational procedures. The standard of extant (pre National Operational Guidance transition) operational guidance in each of the 3 FRS is high. Standard operational procedures /service operational policy and procedure orders are concise and easily digestible. They are also predicated on hazard and risk control measures therefore are already closely aligned to the principles of National Operational Guidance.

All 3 Welsh FRS have invested substantial time and effort to adopt National Operational Guidance, including detailed implementation processes, but they are all at different points on the journey. This is entirely understandable as their starting positions are all different as is the available resourcing within each FRS. The amount of work involved in National Operational Guidance transition is significant and is not something that can be done alongside a day job. We observed duplication of effort in each of the 3 FRS. Whilst there is some collaboration between the FRS there is undoubtedly the opportunity to develop this further.

A formalised all Wales approach to National Operational Guidance transition through the creation of a virtual dedicated tri Service National Operational Guidance Transition Team would in our view reduce duplication of effort whilst delivering high quality operational guidance including standard operational procedures. These standard operational procedures could be refined as necessary to suit local circumstances however we see no reason for any significant divergence as the generic hazard and risk controls for any incident type will be the same across Wales. We consider that there would

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also be merit in maintaining an all Wales team for the ongoing management and updating of operational guidance to ensure standardisation and consistency.

Standardised and consistent operational guidance framed around hazard and risk control would support the all Wales approach to Incident Command training and could potentially also form the basis of a standardised approach to Site Specific Risk Information gathering and the development of Operational Tactical Plans. There are examples from across the UK FRS which could be used to form the basis of this approach which we can share with the FRS if they are minded to accept the recommendation.

**Recommendation 2** – an all Wales virtual dedicated National Operational Guidance Transition Team is established across the 3 FRS to develop National standard operational procedures which can be refined for local adoption as necessary. The 3 Welsh FRS should consider mainstreaming this Team to ensure the standardisation and consistency of operational guidance is maintained.

## The relationship between operational guidance and Site Specific Risk Information

It should be stated from the outset that the platforms used to host Site Specific Risk Information within each of the FRS appear to be highly effective as are the mechanisms by which crews access Site Specific Risk Information on the incident ground. The associated Operational Tactical Plans are also of a very high standard. That said, whilst the extant operational guidance in the 3 FRS is predicated on hazard and risk control methodology there was little evidence of any direct relationship between the generic hazard and risk controls set out within standard operational procedures and those captured within Site Specific Risk Information /Operational Tactical Plans in any of the FRS. We would expect to see generic hazard and risk control statements set out within standard operational procedures with site specific hazard and risk control statements set out within Site Specific Risk Information /Operational Tactical Plans.

This results in a lack of consistency across geographical command areas within the individual FRS's which is exacerbated by Site Specific Risk Information policies allowing local discretion over which premises are subject to the Site Specific Risk Information process. From the follow up interviews conducted we were able to establish that the lack of consistency results in what could be a sizeable number of low risk premises having Site Specific Risk Information files when the hazards and risk controls are sufficiently generic to be addressed within the relevant standard operational procedure. This creates an unnecessary workload in having to carry out Site Specific Risk Information familiarisation visits/revisits at such premises when activity would be more effectively targeted at higher risk premises. It also creates an almost 'impenetrable' amount of information to access and maintain.

There is an opportunity with the transition to National Operational Guidance to review Site Specific Risk Information policies and to determine a consistent risk based criteria for premises which require a Site Specific Risk Information file. In practical terms, National Operational Guidance transition should deliver a suite of standard operational procedures predicated on an operational risk assessment for all reasonably foreseeable incident types. The generic hazard and control measure knowledge contained within the standard operational procedures can be supplemented by Site Specific Risk Information at higher risk premises and set out within Operational Tactical Plans which are already used to good effect across the 3 FRS.

Refining the overall number of Site Specific Risk Information files could have significant benefits for station work routines. From what we were able to establish on the follow up interviews the majority

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of high risk premises are subject to annual familiarisation revisits which are distributed out across the personnel on wholetime shift stations (on 4 Watches other than when self-rostering is in operation). This means that typically a Watch will undertake a Site Specific Risk Information familiarisation visit on a high risk premise every 4 years. On stations operating a self-rostering system the time between familiarisation visits can be longer still. As the built environment becomes more complex the requirement for firefighters to maintain current hazard and risk control knowledge becomes more acute.

Time should be allocated within the station work routine for Site Specific Risk Information consolidation whereby when a Watch does not physically undertake a Site Specific Risk Information familiarisation visit they can access any updated Site Specific Risk Information file and Operational Tactical Plan to be studied in conjunction with the relevant standard operational procedures. This activity is particularly appropriate for the night shift.

**Recommendation 3** – Site Specific Risk Information policies to be reviewed and amended to explicitly recognise that the generic hazard and risk control measure knowledge contained within National Operational Guidance can be applied at low risk premises. This should reduce the need to hold Site Specific Risk Information files in significant numbers. Any premises determined to require a Site Specific Risk Information file should have an accompanying Operational Tactical Plan which sets out the premises specific hazards and risk controls in addition to those contained within the relevant operational guidance. Updated Site Specific Risk Information files and Operational Tactical Plans should be routinely accessed by the personnel that did not undertake the most recent re-familiarisation visit to ensure situational awareness is maintained.

## Breathing Apparatus command and control procedures and tactical firefighting

One objective of the follow up meetings was to establish the extent to which the 3 FRS had adopted the National Operational Guidance for Breathing Apparatus. The first area of focus was the designation of Breathing Apparatus Team call signs and search methodology. The second area of focus was to establish the extent to which tactical firefighting and in particular the calculation of tactical flow rates was covered in operational guidance and training. This line of questioning was adopted due to the relevance to the Grenfell Tower incident. As stated previously it is unclear from the GTI Phase 1 report whether Breathing Apparatus Teams were designated call signs or if they were briefed to carry out specific search techniques (directional search or compartment clearance). It is also unclear if any consideration was given to calculating the tactical flow rates of water required to extinguish a fire of such magnitude and whether or not such flow rates could be achieved.

The Training Managers from the 3 FRS were able to demonstrate a comprehensive program of skill acquisition and maintenance for Breathing Apparatus and Compartment Fire Behaviour Training which was aligned to the operational guidance in effect within each FRS and the National Occupational Standards. This covers all aspects of the Breathing Apparatus National Operational Guidance including Breathing Apparatus Team call sign designation and search methodology. From the follow up discussions it was evident that this is a competency area which receives the necessary level of attention.

Training Managers were not able to demonstrate that input on tactical flow rates was delivered on either Breathing Apparatus or Compartment Fire Behaviour courses but they all believed it was covered on initial Firefighter recruit training courses. There were no explicit references to tactical flow rates or fire ground calculations in any of the operational guidance submitted for the desktop review

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or from the follow up interviews. It is however an issue that has been picked up during the operational assurance process.

Whilst fully recognising the extent of subject matter to be covered on Breathing Apparatus and Compartment Fire Behaviour initial and refresher courses we consider that there would be merit in including input on tactical firefighting. There have been instances in recent years where the selection of inappropriate firefighting techniques and media has contributed to Firefighter fatalities and injuries including at high rise incidents. There have also been instances when firefighting attack has been maintained at incidents when there has been no prospect of suppressing the fire thus causing significant and unnecessary environmental damage. As the complexity of the built environment increases a foundation knowledge of the full spectrum of firefighting techniques including when not to make a direct attack and instead protect surrounding exposures is increasingly essential.

**Recommendation 4** – that input on tactical flow rates for firefighting attack and fire ground calculations be included on the syllabus for Breathing Apparatus and Compartment Fire Behaviour initial and refresher courses. This should be supplemented by an online training module for skill maintenance within the station work routine.

## The effectiveness of the Welsh FRS Operational Assurance process

All 3 FRS have well established structures and processes to deliver Operational Assurance against routine and operational activity. During the follow up meetings we asked the ‘so what’ question with a particular focus on operational decision making/use of the Decision Making Model, Breathing Apparatus command and control procedures and tactical firefighting.

The 3 FRS were able to demonstrate examples of where issues had been identified either during routine activity, training, exercising or on the incident ground and addressed through the Operational Assurance processes. The 3 FRS were not able to demonstrate examples specific to the use of the Decision Making Model and acknowledged that frequently occurring issues such as incremental make ups (assistance messages to Make Pumps 3, followed soon after by Make Pumps 4 etc indicating the absence of clearly defined objectives and a tactical plan) were not identified as being evidence of failure to adhere to the Decision Making Model. The 3 FRS were however able to offer evidence of where failure to adhere to Breathing Apparatus command and control procedures and inappropriate selection of firefighting media had been identified and addressed.

From the evidence presented our view is that the Operational Assurance processes used within the 3 FRS are effective.

At present the Operational Assurance criteria in use in the 3 FRS are framed around the National Occupational Standards. Should the 3 FRS be minded to accept the recommendations contained within this report the Operational Assurance process would be the mechanism by which to determine the extent to which they had been actioned. This would require the Operational Assurance criteria to be amended to capture specific evidence in relation to the recommendations.

**Recommendation 5** - Should the 3 FRS be minded to accept the recommendations contained within this report the Operational Assurance criteria in use within each of the FRS should be amended to capture specific evidence in relation to the recommendations in order to demonstrate they are being applied on the incident ground. Alternatively the 3 FRS could utilise a Thematic Assurance process to target the issues identified within this report.

Thematic Review in to the extent to which the Welsh Fire and Rescue Services have taken action to address the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations

## Findings – extent to which the recommendations of the previous Thematic Review have been actioned

The last Thematic Review ‘Learning lessons to avoid safety critical incidents – how well do Fire and Rescue Authorities learn lessons from incidents to improve public and firefighter safety’ was published in 2017. The Thematic Review made 8 recommendations progress against which is considered below.

*R1 - Once an initial gap analysis has been undertaken following the receipt of learning from an external source, FRAs should ensure that the process is properly recorded. The recording of the decision making process in relation to adopting, or not adopting, national recommendations is essential.*

All 3 FRS undertook a pre-emptive gap analysis based on information relating to the Grenfell Tower fire as it emerged and from what was reported in the media from London Fire Brigade officers giving evidence to the GTI. As a result good progress had already been made against many of the recommendations contained within the GTI Phase 1 report when it was released in October 2019. The 3 FRS have used their internal systems and governance arrangements to record and monitor the actions taken as a result their gap analysis. These actions are reported regularly to Principal Officers. Of the recommendations selected from the GTI report for consideration during this Thematic Review only one (GTI Recommendation 33.20) has not been adopted by the FRS due to the technology required to address the recommendation not being available at this time.

*R2 - FRAs should ensure that risk critical learning is cascaded through the organisation in a timely manner, focusing on those staff to whom the learning will have the greatest benefit from a risk reduction perspective.*

The 3 FRS were able to offer evidence as to how risk critical issues, particularly around the risk of external fire spread from Aluminium Composite Material Cladding, were cascaded to the relevant staff.

Following initial theoretical input provided across its service area, South Wales FRS prioritised the practical training facilitated by West Midlands FS for personnel at stations in the Cardiff and Newport areas.

Mid & West Wales FRS focused their training on crews from the Swansea area where the majority of their high rise risks are located. The training was then cascaded to other crews who make up the pre-determined attendance to high rise incidents. Mid & West Wales FRS are also exploring the potential for developing their live fire high rise training with West Midlands FS, which would be prioritised for personnel in the highest risk areas.

North Wales FRS reviewed the Site Specific Risk Information for high rise buildings to take account of the potential for external fire spread, which provided the opportunity for personnel based in those areas to familiarise themselves with the risk. North Wales FRS Officer Development days also took account of the GTI Phase 1 report recommendations and focused on external fire spread.

As a result of Covid restrictions we were not able to undertake station visits and speak to operational crews directly to establish the extent to which this learning had been absorbed.

*R3 - FRAs should ensure that the mediums used to communicate learning to various staff groups is appropriate to their needs, clearly sets out the reasons for bringing it to their attention and is told in a format and manner that will be retained by the audience. Consideration should also be given to*

Thematic Review in to the extent to which the Welsh Fire and Rescue Services have taken action to address the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations

*building in a 360 degree approach to inform those raising issues when significant changes are to be made.*

The 3 FRS have used a balance of theoretical and practical training to address the GTI Phase 1 report recommendations. They have used information technology to provide easy access to relevant information, covering areas such as operational guidance, alerts and updated Site Specific Risk Information. Specific examples include South Wales FRS providing initial theoretical training to over 900 personnel, Mid & West Wales FRS Business Fire Safety Department providing specialist input and North Wales FRS publishing procedural alerts allowing their personnel to immediately access relevant risk information.

This has been supplemented with practical high rise training and exercising for control and operational personnel utilising the built environment and training facilities, along with specialised training in West Midlands FS.

As stated previously as a result of Covid restrictions we were not able to undertake station visits and speak to operational crews directly to establish the extent to which this learning had been absorbed.

The 360 degree aspect of this recommendation is not relevant in this instance as the GTI learning is from an external source.

*R4 - FRAs should look to introduce quality assurance systems that regularly test how well risk critical learning is received and retained.*

From what we were able to establish the Operational Assurance criteria in use within the 3 FRS is framed around National Occupational Standards. The Operational Assurance criteria would therefore need to be amended to capture evidence against specific aspects of risk critical learning. Alternatively the FRS could undertake a Thematic Assurance process to establish the extent to which risk critical learning has been absorbed (Recommendation 5 of this report refers).

*R5 - FRAs should ensure that the wealth of information derived through the Hot Debriefing processes is captured and shared where appropriate.*

The Operational Learning Systems in each FRS should have the facility to capture Hot Debrief outcomes as a matter of routine. It has not been possible to establish definitely through this Review whether this is the norm. Further research is therefore required to offer an informed view.

*R6 - FRAs should review their ARA processes to ensure they are fit for purpose and that they feed into the wider processes of capturing organisational learning.*

It has not been possible to establish definitely through this Review whether this is the norm. Further research is therefore required to offer an informed view.

*R7 - FRAs should ensure that learning in risk critical environments is maximised through realistic training especially given the decline in 'fire' incidents over the past few years. It is also important that this training is carried out by personnel working together within their normal crews.*

The process of crew based training appears to be well established. All 3 FRS offered evidence of crews training and exercising together on high rise scenarios.

Thematic Review in to the extent to which the Welsh Fire and Rescue Services have taken action to address the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations

Training has been prioritised on a risk basis and concentrated around the major urban conurbations, where the majority of high rise buildings are located. This training is predominantly carried out by crews and personnel who work together on a day to day basis.

*R8 - The report highlights a number of areas of good practice and where systems being developed show much potential for the future. It is recommended that these systems and processes, in particular those policies on operational monitoring and assurance, are shared through the NIC to adopt a common approach and to avoid duplication of effort.*

It appears that engagement through the National Issue Committee has been affected by external factors and the impact of the Covid pandemic therefore progress in this area has been limited. This Thematic Review identified duplication of effort around the implementation of National Operational Guidance (Recommendation 2 of this report refers). Whatever the vehicle used by the Welsh FRS to coordinate and deliver collaboration, whether that be the National Issue Committee or some other mechanism, it needs the necessary strategic leadership support to succeed.

#### Acknowledgements

Our sincere thanks to the Lead Officers from the 3 FRS, Assistant Chief Fire Officer Richard Prendergast from South Wales FRS, Area Manager Peter Greenslade from Mid & West Wales FRS and Assistant Chief Fire Officer Kevin Roberts from North Wales FRS for their support to this Review. Our sincere thanks also to the Lead Officers nominated to meet with us on the follow up visits. The levels of engagement, openness and candour were exemplary and all of the Officers involved are a credit to the Welsh FRS.

## Recommendations

**Recommendation 1** – that the Welsh FRS include a detailed description of each stage of the FRS Decision Making Model similar to that contained within Appendix 4 of the legacy Fire and Rescue Service Manual Volume 2 Fire Service Operations Incident Command Third Edition 2008 within their operational guidance and Incident Command training syllabus. This description should extend to how the model should be used to set objectives to deliver a tactical plan and to continually review the effectiveness of the plan.

Postscript – the Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor has engaged with the Chair of the National Fire Chiefs Council over this issue. An NFCC workstream has been tasked with developing Incident Command training materials which should address this recommendation.

**Recommendation 2** – an all Wales virtual dedicated National Operational Guidance Transition Team is established across the 3 FRS to develop National standard operational procedures which can be refined for local adoption as necessary. The 3 Welsh FRS should consider mainstreaming this Team to ensure the standardisation and consistency of operational guidance is maintained.

**Recommendation 3** – Site Specific Risk Information policies to be reviewed and amended to explicitly recognise that the generic hazard and risk control measure knowledge contained within National Operational Guidance can be applied at low risk premises. This should reduce the need to hold Site Specific Risk Information files in significant numbers. Any premises determined to require a Site Specific Risk Information file should have an accompanying Operational Tactical Plan which sets out the premises specific hazards and risk controls in addition to those contained within the relevant operational guidance. Updated Site Specific Risk Information files and Operational Tactical Plans

Thematic Review in to the extent to which the Welsh Fire and Rescue Services have taken action to address the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations

should be routinely accessed by the personnel that did not undertake the most recent re-familiarisation visit to ensure situational awareness is maintained.

**Recommendation 4** – that input on tactical flow rates for firefighting attack and fire ground calculations be included on the syllabus for Breathing Apparatus and Compartment Fire Behaviour initial and refresher courses. This should be supplemented by an online training module for skill maintenance within the station work routine.

**Recommendation 5** - Should the 3 FRS be minded to accept the recommendations contained within this report the Operational Assurance criteria in use within each of the FRS should be amended to capture specific evidence in relation to the recommendations in order to demonstrate they are being applied on the incident ground. Alternatively the 3 FRS could utilise a Thematic Assurance process to target the issues identified within this report.

Y Grŵp Addysg a Gwasanaethau Cyhoeddus  
Education and Public Services Group

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Llywodraeth Cymru  
Welsh Government

Eich Cyf/Your Ref:  
Ein Cyf/Our Ref:

Date: 31 January 2020

Dear Peter,

### **Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report recommendations**

I was given the following action at the CFOs and Chairs meeting with the Deputy Minister on 13 November 2019;

**ACTION: As part of wider assurance arrangements, Dan Stephens to contact CFOs to establish a mechanism for reporting action on the operational recommendations in the Grenfell Inquiry report**

I subsequently wrote to the CFOs of the 3 Welsh FRS on 30 November 2019 requesting their initial responses to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI) Phase 1 report recommendations and advising that I was minded to use the responses to form the basis of a Thematic Review in order to give the necessary assurances to the Minister.

I have now received all 3 responses, for which I am grateful. At the same time I have also considered a report by the previous CFRA which looked at the extent to which the recommendations of previous Thematic Reviews had been actioned.

This report identified that not enough time had passed to make a judgement on the effectiveness in this respect of the last Thematic Review (Learning lessons to avoid safety critical incidents – how well do Fire and Rescue Authorities in Wales learn lessons from incidents to improve public and firefighter safety?) undertaken in 2017.

I am of the view that the Grenfell Tower incident meets the ‘safety critical’ criteria contemplated in the last Thematic Review. I am also of the view that sufficient time has

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*We welcome receiving correspondence in Welsh. Any correspondence received in Welsh will be answered in Welsh and corresponding in Welsh will not lead to a delay in responding.*

elapsed since the last Thematic Review for the FRS to have acted upon the recommendations.

It is my intention therefore to use the outcomes of this Thematic Review to also form a judgement on the extent to which the recommendations arising from the last Thematic Review have been acted upon.

Accompanying this letter is a table containing the GTI recommendations on which this review will focus. A short rationale is provided explaining why each recommendation has been selected along with the means by which the extent to which the recommendation has been actioned will be judged (under the column entitled 'Evidence'). The selected recommendations are predominantly operational in nature.

I will conduct the review in two stages. In the first instance I will undertake a desktop review of FRS doctrine and policy as set out within the evidence column. Thereafter I propose to follow up where necessary through discussions with relevant FRS personnel and undertaking visits to the FRS.

I anticipate concluding the desktop review by the end of April with any follow up discussions or visits taking in place in May through to July. In order to meet this timeline I would be grateful if you could ensure I receive the requested documentation via email by 28 February. Can you also copy in Steve Bryant ([Steve.Bryant001@gov.wales](mailto:Steve.Bryant001@gov.wales)) to your response please?

If it assists I would be happy to arrange a telephone call to discuss the review in more detail and to confirm the doctrine I require acknowledging that M&WWFRS may use different terminology to that which I have used in the attached table.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. Stephens', followed by a long horizontal line.

**Dan Stephens** QFSM

Chief Fire & Rescue Adviser / Tân ac Achub Ymgynghorydd Prif

Y Grŵp Addysg a Gwasanaethau Cyhoeddus  
Education and Public Services Group

Kevin Roberts  
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Llywodraeth Cymru  
Welsh Government

Eich Cyf/Your Ref:  
Ein Cyf/Our Ref:

Date: 31 January 2020

Dear Kevin,

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Yours sincerely,

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**Dan Stephens** QFSM

Chief Fire & Rescue Adviser / Tân ac Achub Ymgynghorydd Prif

Y Grŵp Addysg a Gwasanaethau Cyhoeddus  
Education and Public Services Group

Richard Prendergast  
Assistant Chief Fire Officer  
South Wales Fire & Rescue Service  
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Llywodraeth Cymru  
Welsh Government

Eich Cyf/Your Ref:  
Ein Cyf/Our Ref:

Date: 31 January 2020

Dear Richard,

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I will conduct the review in two stages. In the first instance I will undertake a desktop review of FRS doctrine and policy as set out within the evidence column. Thereafter I propose to follow up where necessary through discussions with relevant FRS personnel and undertaking visits to the FRS.

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Yours sincerely,

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**Dan Stephens** QFSM

Chief Fire & Rescue Adviser / Tân ac Achub Ymgynghorydd Prif

## Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry

### Phase 1 Report Recommendations selected for Thematic Review Assessment

#### Mid & West Wales Fire and Rescue Service

Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance			
High Rise Residential Building Materials						Full	Part	N/A	
2	33.10b	<p>Fire and rescue services [should] ensure that their personnel at all levels understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise it when it occurs.</p>	<p>To ensure relevant personnel are aware of the risks, a high-rise residential buildings presentation was delivered to all stations and officers in the Swansea area, where the majority of risks are located, with the intention to then deliver the presentation to other areas where there are similar risks.</p> <p>A link has been established between the High Rise Residential Building Task Group set up by the National Fire Chiefs Council and the Welsh Fire and Rescue Services, to allow the Task Group's findings to be fed back. The Standard Operating Procedure is aligned with National Occupational Guidance.</p> <p>The Business Fire Safety Department identified buildings whose external envelope and / or cladding may have presented a risk that needed to be addressed. Responsible persons for such buildings were written to, and the Joint Fire Control made aware so should an incident occur, responding crews are made aware of the risk.</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of operational doctrine to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - If the Welsh FRS are basing their doctrine (Standard Operational Procedures) on National Operational Guidance then this hazard along with the control measure knowledge and tactics should be explicitly set out within an Operational Risk Assessment on which the Standard Operational Procedure should be developed.</p> <p>This should then be used to inform the learning outcomes of any associated training</p>	<p>Desktop review of FRS doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>	√		
<b>Firefighting information</b>									

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
3	33.11a	The London Fire Brigade [should] review, and revise as appropriate, Appendix 1 to PN633 to ensure that it fully reflects the principles in Generic Risk Assessment 3.2	The Operational Risk Management Department has a coordinating role in relation to operational intelligence gathering. There is a standard operating procedure in place for operational intelligence gathering. This is supported by a suite of documentation such as a guide to site specific risk information and the provision of operational risk information system.	Ops	A review of operational doctrine to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned. Rationale - PN633 is the London Fire Brigade High Rise Standard Operating Procedure. A review of Welsh FRS Standard Operating Procedures and Site Specific Risk Information policies will establish the extent to which Standard Operating Procedures form the foundation of and integrate with Site Specific Risk Information gathering processes. The Standard Operating Procedure should set out the generic hazard and risk controls to provide foundation underpinning knowledge to all operational personnel. The Site Specific Risk Information and associated operational plan should build on this with operational information specific to the premises. Appendix 1 of PN633 provides guidance on the type of hazard information that should be gathered on a Site Specific Risk Information inspection. This Key Area of Assessment seeks to establish to what extent this is explicitly set out in Welsh FRS policy and if it is set out then to what extent it is adhered to in practice.	Desktop review of FRS doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules Desktop review of FRS Site Specific Risk Information policy and associated guidance Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
4	33.11b	The London Fire Brigade [should] ensure that all officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in carrying out the requirements of PN633 relating to the inspection of high-rise buildings	To ensure all relevant risks are able to be consistently identified with appropriate risk control measures then put in place, all personnel of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in undertaking risk gathering inspections of premises / sites. This is a requirement of development portfolios for Crew, Watch and Station Managers.  The importance attributed to operational intelligence gathering is reflected in other relevant standard operating procedures, for example the standard operating procedure for high rise firefighting specifically mentions operational intelligence gathering as a key control measure. This operational intelligence gathering work forms the basis of the detail of the risk register.				√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
					At the Grenfell Tower incident there was no operational pre plan contained within the Site Specific Risk Information which contributed to the absence of defined objectives or a cohesive tactical plan on the night				
<b>Plans</b>									
7	33.12	All fire and rescue services [should] be equipped to receive and store electronic plans and to make them available to incident commanders and control room managers.	<p>The Business Fire Safety Department is able to receive and store plans electronically, which can be accessed via mobile data terminals.</p> <p>Joint Fire Control are able to receive and store electronic plans and can access plans that are available to crews via the mobile data terminal. Development work is ongoing to update mobile data terminals for the three Welsh Fire and Rescue Services and to improve information sharing by linking the mobilising system (Vision) and live information data (BOSS). This will then allow such information to be available on the incident ground.</p> <p>A new Incident Command Unit is operational that allows access to all software systems.</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of FRS systems to establish the extent to which this recommendation is actioned</p> <p>Rationale - Floor plans are an integral component of Site Specific Risk Information and are necessary in order to complete robust search audits (referenced in detail below within the rationale for including Recommendations 23 – 25)</p>	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
<b>Firefighting lifts</b>									
8	33.13a	The owner and manager of every high-rise residential building [should] be required by law to carry out regular inspections of any	This forms part of the Business Fire Safety audit process to ensure compliance with the Fire Safety Order. Additionally, owners and managers of high rise residential buildings are asked to contact the Joint Fire Control monthly to advise of the operating condition of their lift(s).	Pol.	A review of FRS systems to establish the extent to which these recommendations have been addressed given that Article 38 of the Fire Safety Order allows this already	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance			
		lifts that are designed to be used by firefighters in an emergency and to report the results of such inspections to their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals.	Joint Fire Control will then if needed, update the site specific risk information for the building. If a lift is not available for use, this will also trigger a pre-arranged contingency plan.		Rationale – to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS are able to disseminate this information to responding crews to inform contingency planning (going beyond a note on the mobilising system to inform crews as they respond and to include proactively altering any tactical plan contained within the Site Specific Risk Information for the premises)	including how temporary changes in hazard and risk profiles are communicated to Operational personnel Desktop review of Station work routines Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary				
9	33.13b	The owner and manager of every high-rise residential building [should] be required by law to carry out regular tests of the mechanism which allows firefighters to take control of the lifts and to inform their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals that they have done so.	Included above.					√		
		<b>Control – incident communication</b>								
10	33.14a	The London Fire Brigade should review its policies on communications between the control room and the	The Decision Making Model is embedded in all aspects of incident command, including communications. This is tested by assessment every two years for all levels of incident commanders.	Ops.	A review of FRS doctrine and Information Technology systems to establish the extent to which these recommendations have been actioned	Desktop review of doctrine relating to Incident Command and associated training modules	/	/	/	

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance			
		incident commander	The accepted procedure is for communications to be established between the Joint Fire Control and the Command Support function. Additional options are available, such as dedicated talk groups and point to point communications. There is also the option of utilising Airwave Tactical Advisers. Officers can attend the Command Room at the Joint Fire Control to enhance communications options at an incident.		Rationale – to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS train Commanders in the use of the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model specifically in relation to Communication and Control. To establish the extent to which Commanders can effectively communicate directly with Fire Control and vice versa	Desktop review of Fire Control communication protocols and associated training modules Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary				
11	33.14b	All officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of Crew Manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room;	<p>Specific high rise training has been provided to supplement existing training, with appropriate standard message format being a key requirement.</p> <p>Station and Group Managers receive Command Room training which gives an overview of the Joint Fire Control, including how incidents are managed for business as usual and how this develops to support a major incident.</p> <p>Tactical Managers have a personal issue Airwave radio so are able to monitor messages as needed. There is also the option of communicating with Fire Control via mobile phone.</p>					√		
12	33.14c	All [control room operators] of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above [should] receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with	Comprehensive training is provided specifically for high rise incidents for Joint Fire Control personnel. Key elements of the training include deciding on the appropriateness of an evacuation strategy and communicating fire survival guidance. Work is ongoing to develop an incident command qualification for Control Supervisors,					√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
		the incident commander;							
13	33.14d	A dedicated communication link [should] be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander	There are measures in place to ensure such communication can be established via Airwave radios (each officer on the Tactical Officers rota has their own radio issued), through command support or the Incident Command Unit. If deemed appropriate, a Command Room can be established at the Joint Fire Control where an Officer can attend and liaise between the Incident Commander and the Senior Control Manager.				√		
<b>Emergency calls</b>									
17	33.15d	Electronic systems [should] be developed to record [fire survival guidance] information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units;	<p>This matter is under the consideration of the high rise working group. A review of mobile data terminals had been undertaken and new updated systems are scheduled for introduction throughout 2020.</p> <p>Part of this updated approach will allow the Vision mobilising system to update BOSS to give live information, which would be available on the Incident Command Unit.</p> <p>Further work has been ongoing to digitally enhance the fire ground, including provision of Wi-Fi bubbles for appliances, mobile tablets for Officers, potentially live streaming video footage from body worn cameras and using GPS trackers to monitor the location of personnel.</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of FRS systems to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - To establish the extent to which Fire Control can effectively communicate fire survival guidance information directly with the Command Team on the incident ground (Operational Decision Making Model - Incident Information)</p>	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary		√	
18	33.15d	Policies should be developed for managing a	Training is provided for control and operational staff to recognise the potential need for a change of approach. A 'General Information' page is available to Control Operators to ensure	Ops.	A review of operational doctrine to confirm that these recommendations have been actioned	Desktop review of doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
		transition from “stay put” to “get out”.	<p>a consistent approach is adopted. All control staff have taken part in a high-rise table top exercise that focused on such a change of advice</p> <p>The standard operating procedure for high rise fighting details matters that should be considered in deciding on a potential change from stay put to get out.</p>		<p>Rationale - A reasonably foreseeable hazard at a high rise incident is a breach of compartmentation compromising the stay put policy. The control measure in these circumstances is partial or full evacuation. It is acknowledged that the control measure knowledge and tactics need to be fully developed through National Occupational Guidance and then embedded within FRS doctrine however the expectation is that the FRS should provide interim guidance to Operational and Fire Control personnel</p>	<p>buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules</p> <p>Desktop review of Fire Control communication protocols and associated training modules</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>			
19	33.15e	Control room staff [should] receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers	Included above.						√
20	33.16	Steps [should] be taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room	<p>Information available to Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service and South Wales Fire and Rescue Service at the Joint Fire Control is able to be viewed by North Wales Fire and Rescue Service Control as soon as it is received. A Computer Aided Drawing view is available to view the incident information in the host control room.</p> <p>Calls are passed via Data Electronic Incident Transfer, which allows the exact information to be transferred between control rooms without double keying.</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of FRS systems to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS buddy arrangements allow access to risk critical incident information by the assisting Fire Control</p>	<p>Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to assisting Fire Control(s)</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>	√		
21	33.17	The [London Ambulance Service] and the [Metropolitan Police	Further investigation is necessary before progressing this recommendation, with the suggestion that the work could be carried out by	Ops.	A review of FRS systems and examination of Joint Emergency Services Group documentation to confirm that this	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the		√	

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
		should] review their protocols and policies to ensure that their operators can identify [fire survival guidance] calls (as defined by the London Fire Brigade) and pass them to the London Fire Brigade as soon as possible	<p>the Joint Emergency Services Group's Adverse Incident Group. Consideration will also need to be given to the Dyfed Powys Police Control arrangements. Fire survival guidance training with South Wales Police Control Operators is scheduled to be progressed throughout 2020.</p> <p>A date for commencement of training with Welsh Ambulance Services Trust Control is being worked towards.</p>		<p>recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - to establish the extent to which the Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police are able to pass fire survival guidance call information to the Welsh FRS</p>	receiving of fire survival guidance call information from Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary			
<b>Command and control</b>									
22	33.18a	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources	All standard operating procedures highlight the Decision Making Model and Joint Decision Model. It is embedded in the training of those seeking to become Incident Commanders from the initial stages of such training, and remains an area of focus through the other levels of incident Command, both in training and reaccreditation assessments.	Ops.	<p>A review of operational doctrine to confirm that these recommendations have been actioned</p> <p>Rationale – There are two elements to this Key Area of Assessment. Firstly to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS train Commanders in the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model and Decision Control Process which is an integral component of the Incident Command Foundation Guidance. At the Grenfell Tower incident there was very little if any evidence of adherence with the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model until the attendance of Assistant Commissioner Roe. This is</p>	<p>Desktop review of doctrine relating to Incident Command and associated training modules</p> <p>Desktop review of FRS Breathing Apparatus Command and Control and tactical firefighting procedures and associated training modules</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>	√		
23	33.18b	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form	<p>There is an emphasis on appropriate briefing of breathing apparatus teams, and that the teams have understood the information provided, Drawings and maps are used to provide relevant detail</p> <p>Matters covered in the briefing include the nature and layout of the structure, area(s) to be searched, hazards and risks presented, equipment to be used and search procedures to be used.</p>					√	

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
		that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room).	Equally, debriefing is emphasised, utilising annotated plans and /or maps of the structure as necessary.		specifically in regards to gathering incident, hazard and resource information, prioritising objectives and developing a tactical plan. Recommendation 22 refers. The second element links back to recommendations 5-7 and is as much about Breathing Apparatus search audit techniques as it is about communication. It also applies across all incident types. There are two methods of search; directional (left or right hand orientation) or room clearance. Reading the GTI report it is not clear that London Fire Brigade consistently employed either. That coupled with an absence of any search audit process would make it almost impossible for an Officer in Charge to have any confidence that a floor had been cleared whether on the basis of operational intelligence gathered on scene, information received via Fire Control or through active fire survival guidance calls. Recommendations 23 – 25 refer.				
24	33.19	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.	Joint Fire Control can establish a dedicated Airwave talk group with an Incident Commander if needed, in addition to allocated incident channels. If a Command Room is set up at the Joint Fire Control, the attending officer would normally establish communications with the Incident Commander by mobile phone. The Officer at the Command Room would also be able to monitor radio communications via his / her own allocated Airwave radio and communications directed to the Control room				√		
25	33.20	The London Fire Brigade [should] investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the	No information provided.						√

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
		bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording fire survival guidance information and the results of deployments.							
<b>Equipment</b>									
26	33.21a	The London Fire Brigade [should] urgently take steps to obtain equipment that enables firefighters wearing helmets and breathing apparatus to communicate with the bridgehead effectively, including when operating in high-rise buildings;	New digital, intrinsically safe breathing apparatus radio communications have been procured and are available for use in 2020. It is anticipated this will greatly improve communications between breathing apparatus teams and the bridgehead at high rise incidents	Ops.	A review of FRS communication and command support equipment provision to ensure this capability is operational and effective A review of FRS training records to ensure all personnel required to undertake command support duties are appropriately trained  Rationale – Effective communications and command support provision are fundamental to achieving safe systems of work on the incident ground	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to assisting Fire Control(s) Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
27	33.21b	The London Fire Brigade [should] urgently take steps to ensure that the command support	Command support is fully embedded in policy and standard operating procedures with relevant training provided. This can be instigated from the first appliance's attendance at an incident.	Ops.		Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the receiving of fire survival	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence Required	Compliance		
		system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use	A new Incident Command Unit has been procured and training provided, which has an improved software capability. This provides enhanced situational awareness at incidents and improves the recording and use of information, contributing to continued effective resolution of incidents.			guidance call information from Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary.			

## Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry

### Phase 1 Report Recommendations selected for Thematic Review Assessment

#### North Wales Fire and Rescue Service

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
							Yes	No	N/A
<b>High Rise Residential Building materials</b>									
2	33.10b	Fire and rescue services [should] ensure that their personnel at all levels understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise it when it occurs.	<p>Work has been progressed prior to the publication of the GTI phase 1 report, including revisiting available learning material that would assist in preparing for and dealing with such incidents.</p> <p>A strategic gap analysis has been carried out for fires in tall buildings within the wider framework of analyses of the operational environment linked to National Operational Guidance. Guidance documentation and training materials have been developed. Examples are a Learn Pro module, flexi-duty officer development days and the issuing of procedural alerts.</p> <p>Information drawn for the strategic gap analysis and work to address any issues identified has been shared with the other Welsh FRS via the National Occupational Guidance Welsh Implementation Forum.</p> <p>Site specific risk information was updated following release of the GTI phase 1 report, with personnel reminded of the need to familiarise themselves with such information. Relevant information received via the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of operational doctrine to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - If the Welsh FRS are basing their doctrine (Standard Operational Procedures) on National Operational Guidance then this hazard along with the control measure knowledge and tactics should be explicitly set out within an Operational Risk Assessment on which the Standard Operational Procedure should be developed. This should then be used to inform the learning outcomes of any associated training</p>	Desktop review of FRS doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
			learning programmes is considered at the Operational Learning Forum and publicised where deemed appropriate.						
<b>Firefighting information</b>									
3	33.11a	The London Fire Brigade [should] review, and revise as appropriate, Appendix 1 to PN633 to ensure that it fully reflects the principles in Generic Risk Assessment 3.2	<p>A standard operating procedure is in effect supported by a Learn Pro module to provide current information, whilst moving towards alignment with National Occupational Guidance.</p> <p>A suite of operational aide memoires have been developed to reflect relevant hazard and control measures. For fires in tall buildings, the availability of updated information is planned to be enhanced once the mobile data terminal upgrade has been completed.</p>	Ops.	A review of operational doctrine to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned. Rationale - PN633 is the London Fire Brigade High Rise Standard Operating Procedure. A review of Welsh FRS Standard Operating Procedures and Site Specific Risk Information policies will establish the extent to which Standard Operating Procedures form the foundation of and integrate with Site Specific Risk Information gathering processes. The Standard Operating Procedure should set out the generic hazard and risk controls to provide foundation underpinning knowledge to all operational personnel. The Site Specific Risk Information and associated operational plan should build on this with operational information specific to the premises. Appendix 1 of PN633 provides guidance on the type of hazard information that should be gathered on a Site Specific Risk Information inspection. This Key Area of	Desktop review of FRS doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules Desktop review of FRS Site Specific Risk Information policy and associated guidance Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
4	33.11b	The London Fire Brigade [should] ensure that all officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above are trained in carrying out the requirements of PN633 relating to the inspection of high-rise buildings	<p>All Officers of the rank of Crew Manager and above have received site specific risk information training since the inception of the Record Management System, which is used as an electronic means for capturing site specific risk information. Consideration is being given to collating relevant training material onto the Learn-Pro e-learning platform.</p> <p>The system uses the Provision of Operational Risk Information System (PORIS), which has the ability to record information on active and passive fire safety measures.</p>				√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
					Assessment seeks to establish to what extent this is explicitly set out in Welsh FRS policy and if it is set out then to what extent it is adhered to in practice. At the Grenfell Tower incident there was no operational pre plan contained within the Site Specific Risk Information which contributed to the absence of defined objectives or a cohesive tactical plan on the night				
<b>Plans</b>									
7	33.12	All fire and rescue services [should] be equipped to receive and store electronic plans and to make them available to incident commanders and control room managers.	There is the capability available to accept electronic plans, convert them to PDF and install them onto mobile data terminals. Mobile data terminals are being replaced with 'tough books' throughout 2020.  Development work is ongoing for hard copy folders detailing risk information for the identified twelve tall buildings within North Wales to be available on appliances. This information will be duplicated in Fire Control, and stored as part of station information packs, should crews from neighbouring stations attend as a standby move.	Ops.	A review of FRS systems to establish the extent to which this recommendation is actioned  Rationale - Floor plans are an integral component of Site Specific Risk Information and are necessary in order to complete robust search audits (referenced in detail below within the rationale for including Recommendations 23 – 25)	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
<b>Firefighting lifts</b>									
8	33.13a	The owner and manager of every high-rise residential building [should] be required by law to carry out regular	Only one of the twelve tall buildings has a designated firefighting lift. The requirements are addressed via enforcement of the Fire Safety Order.	Pol.	A review of FRS systems to establish the extent to which these recommendations have been addressed given that Article 38 of the Fire Safety Order allows this already	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance			
		inspections of any lifts that are designed to be used by firefighters in an emergency and to report the results of such inspections to their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals.	Consideration is being given by one Local Authority to upgrade lifts in other blocks of flats to firefighting lifts. Relevant Officers are embedded in the working group to progress.		Rationale – to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS are able to disseminate this information to responding crews to inform contingency planning (going beyond a note on the mobilising system to inform crews as they respond and to include proactively altering any tactical plan contained within the Site Specific Risk Information for the premises)	incident ground including how temporary changes in hazard and risk profiles are communicated to Operational personnel Desktop review of Station work routines Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary				
9	33.13b	The owner and manager of every high-rise residential building [should] be required by law to carry out regular tests of the mechanism which allows firefighters to take control of the lifts and to inform their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals that they have done so.	Included above.						√	
		<b>Control – incident communication</b>								
10	33.14a	The London Fire Brigade [should] review its policies on communications between the control room and the	A review is being undertaken in relation to communications between Fire Control and the Incident Commander to take account of the phase 1 recommendations. Both Fire Control and operations engage in the response to the	Ops.	A review of FRS doctrine and Information Technology systems to establish the extent to which these recommendations have been actioned	Desktop review of doctrine relating to Incident Command and associated training modules	√			

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance			
		incident commander	<p>GTI recommendations through the Operational Learning Forum.</p> <p>Procedures are in place to ensure appropriate messages are sent to take account of a situation where the stay put policy is revoked. This has been supported by the issue of a procedural alert. Fire Control have a presence on the Incident Command Unit review board to ensure their requirements are addressed.</p>		<p>Rationale – to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS train Commanders in the use of the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model specifically in relation to Communication and Control. To establish the extent to which Commanders can effectively communicate directly with Fire Control and vice versa</p>	<p>Desktop review of Fire Control communication protocols and associated training modules Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary</p>				
11	33.14b	All officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of Crew Manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room;	<p>There are initial, ongoing and development programmes that include such training. Examples of this being attendance at and successful completion of the incident command system level 1 – 4 qualification, Local Resilience Forum multi-agency training and use of the XVR incident command simulation suite.</p> <p>Fire Control management and personnel engage and provide assistance with such training opportunities.</p>					√		
12	33.14c	All [control room operators] of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above [should] receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the incident commander.	<p>A review was undertaken after the GTI phase one recommendations were released. The outcomes of the review will be linked to the training provided.</p> <p>Existing arrangements are in place for communications between the Incident Commander and Fire Control to be tested at exercises, an example being a high rise exercise at a Police building in Wrexham where control personnel attended and contributed to the debrief process.</p>					√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
			All the Control Management Team are National Inter-agency Liaison Officers, which assists with effective use of Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme and decision making model principles.						
13	33.14d	A dedicated communication link [should] be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander	The existing communications channel is via the command support function and Incident Command Unit, if in attendance. Consideration is being given to a potential specialist fire ground role to facilitate communications at a high rise incident.				√		
<b>Emergency calls</b>									
17	33.15d	Electronic systems [should] be developed to record [fire survival guidance] information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units;	<p>Work has progressed to improve the handing of callers that require fire survival guidance and how such information can be provided at the incident ground. Procedures have been implemented to ensure that if 'overflow' calls are received that required fire survival guidance, a consistent approach is applied.</p> <p>Mandatory annual fire survival guidance training is provided, including specifically for high rise building fires. Additionally, there is participation in exercises where Fire Control personnel attend the scene.</p> <p>Training encompassing the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme has also been provided. This has assisted in joint working in the co-located control room with North Wales Police.</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of FRS systems to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - To establish the extent to which Fire Control can effectively communicate fire survival guidance information directly with the Command Team on the incident ground (Operational Decision Making Model - Incident Information)</p>	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary		√	

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
18	33.15d	Policies should be developed for managing a transition from “stay put” to “get out”.	<p>Flexi-duty officers and control room managers are provided with training during development days. Proposed collaboration work to ensure consistency with the other Welsh FRS via the Joint Fire Control in Bridgend is being planned. Similarly with neighbouring English FRS that may require assistance in taking overflow calls.</p> <p>Further training is to be provided on a consistent approach with Joint Fire Control and other neighbouring FRS.</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of operational doctrine to confirm that these recommendations have been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - A reasonably foreseeable hazard at a high rise incident is a breach of compartmentation compromising the stay put policy. The control measure in these circumstances is partial or full evacuation. It is acknowledged that the control measure knowledge and tactics need to be fully developed through National Occupational Guidance and then embedded within FRS doctrine however the expectation is that the FRS should provide interim guidance to Operational and Fire Control personnel</p>	<p>Desktop review of doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules</p> <p>Desktop review of Fire Control communication protocols and associated training modules</p>	√		
19	33.15e	Control room staff [should] receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers	Included above.				<p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>	√	
20	33.16	Steps [should] be taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room	<p>Reciprocal arrangements are in place with the Joint Fire Control to be able to view the mobilising systems in use within the Welsh FRS, (BOSS and CadView).</p> <p>Discussions ongoing with neighbouring English FRS to examine the potential for similar arrangements. Liaison ongoing through the National Fire Chiefs Council Mobilising Officers Group to identify potential changes to working practices as a result of the GTI phase one recommendations.</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of FRS systems to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS buddy arrangements allow access to risk critical incident information by the assisting Fire Control</p>	<p>Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to assisting Fire Control(s)</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
21	33.17	The [London Ambulance Service] and the [Metropolitan Police should] review their protocols and policies to ensure that their operators can identify [fire survival guidance] calls (as defined by the London Fire Brigade ) and pass them to the London Fire Brigade as soon as possible.	Co-location with North Wales Police Control assists in liaison. A Welsh Ambulance Services Trust clinician has a presence on the operational dais, which enhances communication with Ambulance colleagues.  The relatively low number of personnel available does present challenges in handling calls for busy periods and / or challenging incidents, until additional resources can be brought in to provide support.	Ops.	A review of FRS systems and examination of Joint Emergency Services Group documentation to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned  Rationale - to establish the extent to which the Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police are able to pass fire survival guidance call information to the Welsh FRS	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the receiving of fire survival guidance call information from Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
<b>Command and control</b>									
22	33.18a	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources	Flexi-duty managers, who have responsibility for deploying resources at an incident have received training in the use of the decision making model and the decision control process through initial, ongoing and development programmes, examples being attendance and successful completion of the Incident Command System qualification and participation in the locality exercise assurance framework.	Ops.	A review of operational doctrine to confirm that these recommendations have been actioned  Rationale – There are two elements to this Key Area of Assessment. Firstly to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS train Commanders in the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model and Decision Control Process which is an integral component of the Incident Command Foundation Guidance. At the Grenfell Tower incident there was very little if any evidence of adherence with	Desktop review of doctrine relating to Incident Command and associated training modules Desktop review of FRS Breathing Apparatus Command and Control and tactical firefighting procedures and associated training modules Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
23	33.18b	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning	The Breathing Apparatus National Occupational Guidance has been fully adopted, as was the Operational Guidance for Breathing Apparatus.  Through the Operational Learning Forum, a breathing apparatus brief / debrief log has been developed and is utilised on all occasions that breathing apparatus is worn. This takes the form				√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room)	of a duplicate book, allowing copies to be utilised as necessary. The log uses the armed forces Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics, and Communication Plan (SMEAC). This is considered an area of notable practice.		the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model until the attendance of Assistant Commissioner Roe. This is specifically in regards to gathering incident, hazard and resource information, prioritising objectives and developing a tactical plan. Recommendation 22 refers. The second element links back to recommendations 5-7 and is as much about Breathing Apparatus search audit techniques as it is about communication. It also applies across all incident types. There are two methods of search; directional (left or right hand orientation) or room clearance. Reading the GTI report it is not clear that London Fire Brigade consistently employed either. That coupled with an absence of any search audit process would make it almost impossible for an Officer in Charge to have any confidence that a floor had been cleared whether on the basis of operational intelligence gathered on scene, information received via Fire Control or through active fire survival guidance calls. Recommendations 23 – 25 refer.				
24	33.19	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.	Airwave radios and mobile phones are used for communication between Fire Control and the Incident Commander.  In relation to communications at the incident itself, following a review of the GTI phase one recommendations by the Operational Learning Forum, a programme of tests was undertaken at relevant high rise buildings to confirm communications could be established and maintained.				√		
25	33.20	The London Fire Brigade [should] investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line	No facility currently available. Enquiries had been undertaken with the CadView supplier to examine options to improve accessibility of information.						√

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance			
		of communication between the control room and the bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording fire survival guidance information and the results of deployments								
<b>Equipment</b>										
26	33.21a	The London Fire Brigade [should] urgently take steps to obtain equipment that enables firefighters wearing helmets and breathing apparatus to communicate with the bridgehead effectively, including when operating in high-rise buildings;	Upgrades have been delivered to the Breathing Apparatus communications capability, which has resulted in an improvement in signal strength and quality. This was tested at a high-rise exercise, and is supported by information from other exercises that highlighted communications was not an issue. This will continue to be monitored during future exercises and operational incidents.	Ops.	A review of FRS communication and command support equipment provision to ensure this capability is operational and effective A review of FRS training records to ensure all personnel required to undertake command support duties are appropriately trained  Rationale – Effective communications and command support provision are fundamental to achieving safe systems of work on the incident ground	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to assisting Fire Control(s) Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√			
27	33.21b	The London Fire Brigade [should] urgently take steps	Command support is embedded in procedures and is monitored via operational assurance. Training is delivered to all personnel who may	Ops.		Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out	√			

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		to ensure that the command support system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use	be required to adopt this role, and has recently been reviewed to ensure it remains compliant with National Occupational Guidance. One Incident Command Unit is in service and is used at larger and more complex incidents. Work has been undertaken to improve communications resilience within the unit, which is now supported by a welfare vehicle.			arrangements for the receiving of fire survival guidance call information from Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary.			

## Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry

### Phase 1 Report Recommendations selected for Thematic Review Assessment

#### South Wales Fire and Rescue Service

Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance			
High Rise Residential Building Materials						Full	Part	N/A	
2	33.10b	<p>Fire and rescue services [should] ensure that their personnel at all levels understand the risk of fire taking hold in the external walls of high-rise buildings and know how to recognise it when it occurs.</p>	<p>Before the Grenfell fire, high rise procedures were developed to take account of previous incidents nationally. The approach for responding to high rise incidents was linked to the development of a standard operational procedure.</p> <p>Following the Grenfell fire a High Rise Task Group was established. An example of the initial work carried out was a 'quick strike' whereby training was provided for signs and symptoms of a fire taking hold in the external walls of a high rise building. This was built on with practical high rise fire training secured with West Midlands FS. We consider this to be an example of notable practice.</p> <p>Key learning outcomes of this training included early identification of building failure (compartmentation) and external fire spread. The High Rise Task Group also worked with the Joint Fire Control to identify stations on the pre-determined attendance for high rise incidents to provide training.</p> <p>National Operational Guidance is continually monitored to ensure standard operating</p>	Ops.	<p>A review of operational doctrine to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - If the Welsh FRS are basing their doctrine (Standard Operational Procedures) on National Operational Guidance then this hazard along with the control measure knowledge and tactics should be explicitly set out within an Operational Risk Assessment on which the Standard Operational Procedure should be developed. This should then be used to inform the learning outcomes of any associated training</p>	<p>Desktop review of FRS doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
			procedures reflect current requirements, and high rise incidents form part of the incident command continuation courses at all levels. Operational performance at such incidents is monitored by the Operational Development and Review Team, with learning outcomes used to develop changes to procedures where needed.						
<b>Firefighting information</b>									
3	33.11a	The London Fire Brigade [should] review, and revise as appropriate, Appendix 1 to PN633 to ensure that it fully reflects the principles in Generic Risk Assessment 3.2	<p>There is a standard operating procedure for operational intelligence gathering in place. This activity is fully embedded in Service work streams, following the Provision of Risk Information System (PORIS) approach.</p> <p>Taking account of the complexity of gathering risk information in relation to high rise buildings, workbooks have been developed to assist personnel with their work.</p> <p>Work is ongoing with West Midlands FS to develop a bespoke software system to enhance the provision of site specific risk information, which will be easily accessible via mobile data terminals.</p> <p>The long term vision is for operational, Business Fire Safety and Community Safety information to all be available against one unique property reference number.</p>	Ops.	A review of operational doctrine to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned. Rationale - PN633 is the London Fire Brigade High Rise Standard Operating Procedure. A review of Welsh FRS Standard Operating Procedures and Site Specific Risk Information policies will establish the extent to which Standard Operating Procedures form the foundation of and integrate with Site Specific Risk Information gathering processes. The Standard Operating Procedure should set out the generic hazard and risk controls to provide foundation underpinning knowledge to all operational personnel. The Site Specific Risk Information and associated operational plan should build on this with operational information specific to the premises. Appendix 1 of PN633 provides guidance on the	Desktop review of FRS doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and associated training modules Desktop review of FRS Site Specific Risk Information policy and associated guidance Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
4	33.11b	The London Fire Brigade [should] ensure that all officers of the rank of Crew Manager	Training is provided to all personnel of Crew Manager and above with specific guidance provided by 'Operational Intelligence for Incidents Booklets,' which provides details of design features in built fire engineering and				√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		and above are trained in carrying out the requirements of PN633 relating to the inspection of high-rise buildings	<p>firefighting systems. This guidance is enhanced by the provision of specific booklets for high rise buildings.</p> <p>Where needed, additional visits to higher risk premises are carried out to enhance familiarisation. Support at inspections can also be provided by a Business Fire Safety officer who will be able to use his / her specialist knowledge to analyse risks.</p>		<p>type of hazard information that should be gathered on a Site Specific Risk Information inspection. This Key Area of Assessment seeks to establish to what extent this is explicitly set out in Welsh FRS policy and if it is set out then to what extent it is adhered to in practice.</p> <p>At the Grenfell Tower incident there was no operational pre plan contained within the Site Specific Risk Information which contributed to the absence of defined objectives or a cohesive tactical plan on the night</p>				
<b>Plans</b>									
7	33.12	All fire and rescue services [should] be equipped to receive and store electronic plans and to make them available to incident commanders and control room managers.	The Computer Aided Drawing team had been tasked with developing plans for all high rise buildings and to ensure those plans available for operational use. Approximately 75% had been completed at the time the submission was provided. The anticipated timescale for completion of the work is twelve months.	Ops.	<p>A review of FRS systems to establish the extent to which this recommendation is actioned</p> <p>Rationale - Floor plans are an integral component of Site Specific Risk Information and are necessary in order to complete robust search audits (referenced in detail below within the rationale for including Recommendations 23 – 25</p>	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary		√	
<b>Firefighting lifts</b>									
8	33.13a	The owner and manager of every high-rise residential	Firefighting lifts are inspected as part of the Business Fire Safety audit process to ensure compliance with the Fire Safety Order. The	Pol.	A review of FRS systems to establish the extent to which these recommendations have	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance			
		building [should] be required by law to carry out regular inspections of any lifts that are designed to be used by firefighters in an emergency and to report the results of such inspections to their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals.	<p>requirements are made clear to the Responsible Person for the premises as part of the audit process.</p> <p>If a lift is identified as defective during an audit, a Firefighter risk form is completed to advise Joint Fire Control, who then 'tag' and make the information available via the turnout sheet and the mobile data terminal. Similarly, if faults are identified by operational personnel through the site specific risk information process, an information exchange form is completed and the same actions are taken by Joint Fire Control.</p>		<p>been addressed given that Article 38 of the Fire Safety Order allows this already</p> <p>Rationale – to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS are able to disseminate this information to responding crews to inform contingency planning (going beyond a note on the mobilising system to inform crews as they respond and to include proactively altering any tactical plan contained within the Site Specific Risk Information for the premises)</p>	<p>arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground including how temporary changes in hazard and risk profiles are communicated to Operational personnel</p> <p>Desktop review of Station work routines</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>				
9	33.13b	The owner and manager of every high-rise residential building [should] be required by law to carry out regular tests of the mechanism which allows firefighters to take control of the lifts and to inform their local fire and rescue service at monthly intervals that they have done so.	Included above.				√			
		<b>Control – incident communication</b>								
10	33.14a	The London Fire Brigade should review its policies	Through practical (West Midlands FS) and theoretical training, communication has been identified as a key area and its application is	Ops.	A review of FRS doctrine and Information Technology systems to establish the extent to which	Desktop review of doctrine relating to Incident Command and	√			

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		on communications between the control room and the incident commander	<p>consistent with the Decision Making Model. Examples of areas covered during the training include high rise specific fire survival guidance and identifying building failure from caller information</p> <p>Messages are usually conveyed via the accepted route of Airwave radios, from command support via the Command Unit, if in attendance.</p> <p>Command room training has been provided for Station and Group Managers, to enhance communication options at a large scale incident.</p>		<p>these recommendations have been actioned</p> <p>Rationale – to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS train Commanders in the use of the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model specifically in relation to Communication and Control. To establish the extent to which Commanders can effectively communicate directly with Fire Control and vice versa</p>	<p>associated training modules</p> <p>Desktop review of Fire Control communication protocols and associated training modules</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel</p> <p>FRS visits as necessary</p>			
1 1	33.14b	All officers who may be expected to act as incident commanders (i.e. all those above the rank of Crew Manager) receive training directed to the specific requirements of communication with the control room;	<p>Theoretical and practical training is provided by the High Rise Task Group supported by the Incident Command Team. Skills are assessed during Incident Command assessments.</p> <p>Training has also been provided to Joint Fire Control personnel to establish effective communications with the Incident Commander, which allows relevant information to be passed to the incident ground to support appropriate decision making.</p>				√		
1 2	33.14c	All [control room operators] of Assistant Operations Manager rank and above [should] receive training directed to the specific	<p>Training has been provided specifically for emergency calls relating to high rise incidents, with areas centred on including fire survival guidance and evacuation strategies. Joint Fire Control are working nationally on the development of an incident command qualification for Control Supervisors.</p>				√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		requirements of communication with the incident commander	.						
1 3	33.14d	A dedicated communication link [should] be provided between the senior officer in the control room and the incident commander	The Incident Commander has a direct link to the Joint Fire Control via appliance mounted radios. If the Incident Commander is a Tactical Manager, s/he will have their own personal issue Airwave radio. At complex incidents, including high rise, the Incident Command Unit will be in attendance, allowing the provision of enhanced communications.				√		
<b>Emergency calls</b>									
1 7	33.15d	Electronic systems [should] be developed to record [fire survival guidance] information in the control room and display it simultaneously at the bridgehead and in any command units;	The communication links in place are via individually issued Airwave radios, appliance mounted radios and via the Incident Command Unit. A Command room will also be stood up for specific incidents, allowing direct communication with the Incident Commander.	Ops.	A review of FRS systems to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned  Rationale - To establish the extent to which Fire Control can effectively communicate fire survival guidance information directly with the Command Team on the incident ground (Operational Decision Making Model - Incident Information)	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to the incident ground Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary		√	
1 8	33.15d	Policies should be developed for managing a transition from “stay put” to “get out”.	A General Information page is available for Control personnel to refer to for fire survival guidance in high rise premises. This has been reviewed following the publication of the GTI phase one recommendations.  Training has been provided to Control personnel to ensure relevant information is gathered from	Ops.	A review of operational doctrine to confirm that these recommendations have been actioned  Rationale - A reasonably foreseeable hazard at a high rise incident is a breach of	Desktop review of doctrine relating to Operations, Fires and firefighting, Fires in buildings, Fires in buildings under construction or demolition and	√		

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
			callers. This information can then be passed to the incident ground as a matter of urgency should it indicate that conditions are deteriorating and a change of tactics may be necessary. Additional training is being developed for the Control Management Team for managing high rise incidents and providing support the Incident Commander.		compartmentation compromising the stay put policy. The control measure in these circumstances is partial or full evacuation. It is acknowledged that the control measure knowledge and tactics need to be fully developed through National Occupational Guidance and then embedded within FRS doctrine however the expectation is that the FRS should provide interim guidance to Operational and Fire Control personnel	associated training modules Desktop review of Fire Control communication protocols and associated training modules Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary			
19	33.15e	Control room staff [should] receive training directed specifically to handling such a change of advice and conveying it effectively to callers.	Included above				√		
20	33.16	Steps [should] be taken to investigate methods by which assisting control rooms can obtain access to the information available to the host control room	Development work has been carried out as a result of a gap analysis. Some of the options considered for handling large volumes of calls requiring fire survival guidance include grouping calls in a conference call and redirecting calls to Police handlers who work alongside the Joint Fire Control.	Ops.	A review of FRS systems to confirm that this recommendation has been actioned  Rationale - to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS buddy arrangements allow access to risk critical incident information by the assisting Fire Control	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to assisting Fire Control(s) Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√		
21	33.17	The [London Ambulance Service] and the [Metropolitan Police	Further investigation is necessary before progressing this recommendation, with the suggestion that the work could be carried out by	Ops.	A review of FRS systems and examination of Joint Emergency Services Group documentation to confirm that this	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the		√	

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		should] review their protocols and policies to ensure that their operators can identify [fire survival guidance] calls (as defined by the London Fire Brigade) and pass them to the London Fire Brigade as soon as possible.	<p>the Joint Emergency Services Group's Adverse Incident Group.</p> <p>Fire survival guidance training with South Wales Police Control Operators is scheduled to be progressed throughout 2020.</p>		<p>recommendation has been actioned</p> <p>Rationale - to establish the extent to which the Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police are able to pass fire survival guidance call information to the Welsh FRS</p>	receiving of fire survival guidance call information from Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary			
<b>Command and control</b>									
2 2	33.18a	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop policies and training to ensure better control of deployments and the use of resources	Deployment and control of resources is carried out in line with Incident Command policies and procedures, with input provided on incident command courses at all levels. It is assessed for Level two and three tactical managers.	Ops.	<p>A review of operational doctrine to confirm that these recommendations have been actioned</p> <p>Rationale – There are two elements to this Key Area of Assessment. Firstly to establish the extent to which the Welsh FRS train Commanders in the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model and Decision Control Process which is an integral component of the Incident Command Foundation Guidance. At the Grenfell Tower incident there was very little if any evidence of adherence with the principles of the Operational Decision Making Model until the attendance of Assistant Commissioner Roe. This is</p>	<p>Desktop review of doctrine relating to Incident Command and associated training modules</p> <p>Desktop review of FRS Breathing Apparatus Command and Control and tactical firefighting procedures and associated training modules</p> <p>Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary</p>	√		
2 3	33.18b	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop policies and training to ensure that better information is obtained from crews returning from deployments and that the information is recorded in a form	<p>Crew members are expected to pass on critical risk information to either a sector, or incident commanders, as appropriate, when such information becomes available. This is achieved either by radio communication or in person.</p> <p>The importance of retrieving information from crews withdrawing from a risk area is covered during the high rise courses in West Midlands FS. This is standard practice across the Service, and is consistent with breathing apparatus course content and requirements.</p>					√	

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		that enables it to be made available immediately to the incident commander (and thereafter to the command units and the control room).			specifically in regards to gathering incident, hazard and resource information, prioritising objectives and developing a tactical plan. Recommendation 22 refers. The second element links back to recommendations 5-7 and is as much about Breathing Apparatus search audit techniques as it is about communication. It also applies across all incident types. There are two methods of search; directional (left or right hand orientation) or room clearance. Reading the GTI report it is not clear that London Fire Brigade consistently employed either. That coupled with an absence of any search audit process would make it almost impossible for an Officer in Charge to have any confidence that a floor had been cleared whether on the basis of operational intelligence gathered on scene, information received via Fire Control or through active fire survival guidance calls. Recommendations 23 – 25 refer.				
2 4	33.19	The London Fire Brigade [should] develop a communication system to enable direct communication between the control room and the incident commander and improve the means of communication between the incident commander and the bridgehead.	The available means for communication between the Incident Commander and the Control room are via command support, enhanced by the Incident Command Unit if in attendance,  If the Incident Commander is a Tactical Manager, s/he will have their own personal issue Airwave radio and be able to communicate directly with Joint Fire Control.				√		
2 5	33.20	The London Fire Brigade [should] investigate the use of modern communication techniques to provide a direct line of communication between the control room and the	There is not an ability for this facility, and there is no move towards creating a link from the operations bridgehead directly to the Joint Fire Control, forward control points (fire engines) or the Incident Command Unit.						√

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance			
		bridgehead, allowing information to be transmitted directly between the control room and the bridgehead and providing an integrated system of recording fire survival guidance information and the results of deployments.								
<b>Equipment</b>										
2 6	33.21a	The London Fire Brigade [should] urgently take steps to obtain equipment that enables firefighters wearing helmets and breathing apparatus to communicate with the bridgehead effectively, including when operating in high-rise buildings;	Breathing apparatus communications equipment has been upgraded to digital. The new Dräger breathing apparatus sets all have integral communications using the latest digital / analogue radios. Repeater packs are carried on the Incident Command Unit to enhance the signal, where needed.  They are tested operationally and in the training environment to ensure reliability, which includes use in high rise buildings.	Ops.	A review of FRS communication and command support equipment provision to ensure this capability is operational and effective A review of FRS training records to ensure all personnel required to undertake command support duties are appropriately trained  Rationale – Effective communications and command support provision are fundamental to achieving safe systems of work on the incident ground	Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the provision of operational intelligence to assisting Fire Control(s) Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary	√			
2 7	33.21b	The London Fire Brigade [should] urgently take steps to ensure that the command support	Operational managers at all levels undertake incident command training and are assessed every three years.	Ops.		Desktop review of responses from the FRS setting out arrangements for the receiving of fire survival	√			

	Para	Recommendation	Submission Summary	Type	Key Area of Assessment	Evidence required	Compliance		
		system is fully operative on all command units and that crews are trained in its use	There is one incident Command Unit available and is crewed by personnel who are competent in the command support function. Incident command system wallets are carried on all front line pumping appliances and are used in accordance with the relevant standard operating procedure.			guidance call information from Welsh Ambulance Services Trust and the Police Discussions with relevant FRS personnel FRS visits as necessary.			